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Abstract 
After decades of debates about species concepts, there is broad agreement that species are evolving 
lineages. However, species classification is still in a state of disorder: different methods of delimitation 
lead to competing outcomes for the same organisms, and the groups recognised as species are of 
widely different kinds. This paper considers whether this problem can be resolved by developing a 
unitary scale for evolutionary independence. Such a scale would show clearly when groups are 
comparable and allow taxonomists to choose a conventional threshold of independence for species 
status. Existing measurement approaches to species delimitation are typically shot down by what I call 
the heterogeneity objection, according to which independently evolving groups are too 
heterogeneous to be captured by a single scale. I draw a parallel with the measurement of 
temperature to argue that this objection does not provide sufficient reasons to abandon the 
measurement approach, and that such an approach may even help to make the vague notion of 
evolutionary independence more precise.  
Keywords: evolutionary independence; evolving lineages; temperature measurement; species; 
species delimitation; taxonomic disorder; 
Resolving taxonomic disorder 
In a recent comment in Nature, Stephen Garnett and Les Christidis (2017) draw attention to what they 
call ‘taxonomic anarchy’: groups recognised as species are of widely different kinds, species 
classifications are unstable, and experts often disagree with the classifications that fellow experts 
come up with. This disorder might seem surprising, given broad agreement that species are evolving 
lineages (De Queiroz 1998; Zachos 2016; Barker 2019). However, this agreement is merely superficial, 
as the notion of evolutionary lineage is understood and operationalised in a large variety of ways. 
Because different operationalisations often yield different results for the same groups of organisms, 
even taxonomists with the same theoretical view on species regularly come up with competing 
classifications (Willis 2017; Zachos 2018; Conix 2018).  
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This state of disorder has direct consequences for scientific research that uses species as its currency 
and thus assumes that species are comparable. For example, the incomparability of species affects 
measures of biodiversity that rely on species richness, diversification analyses, and different kinds of 
macro-ecological research (Isaac et al. 2004; Faurby et al. 2016; Zachos 2018). The consequences of 
taxonomic disorder also extend beyond science to domains such as conservation legislation and the 
regulation of trade in endangered species, which extensively rely on the outcomes of taxonomy. 
Particularly noteworthy are the implications of taxonomic disorder for biodiversity conservation. The 
lack of a reliable and easily accessible inventory of biodiversity forms a major bottleneck in addressing 
the ongoing mass extinction, and taxonomic disorder is often cited as one important factor standing 
in the way of such an inventory: it impedes conservation biology and effective conservation legislation, 
discourages funding organizations from investing in taxonomy, leads to wasting resources on 
competing species lists, and makes taxonomic information difficult to access for non-specialists (Mace 
2004; Khuroo et al. 2007; Garnett and Christidis 2017). 
It is clear that a solution for taxonomic disorder is desirable, and it should be no surprise that users of 
taxonomy regularly call for such a solution (Godfray 2002; Isaac et al. 2004). One potential solution 
that recurs regularly in these debates is the proposal to standardise species delimitation (Conix 2019). 
The idea is that if all species are recognised on the basis of similar principles or methods, the resulting 
species would be comparable and taxonomic disorder greatly reduced. Such standardisation could 
start from the consensus that species are evolving lineages. However, this solution is typically rejected 
on the grounds of what I will call the heterogeneity objection: there is no single standard that can 
capture the vast variety of evolving lineages in the organic world. 
The main aim of this paper is to argue that the heterogeneity objection does not provide good reasons 
to abandon attempts to standardise species delimitation. More positively, I argue that developing 
measurement procedures and a scale of evolutionary independence – a notion frequently used to 
characterise evolutionary lineages – is a promising strategy for standardisation. Note that the 
measurement approach defended here is not an alternative conception of what species are, nor is it 
a claim about what evolutionary lineages are like. Rather, the measurement approach is a strategy to 
tackle the problem of taxonomic disorder, and my claim is that it is a strategy worth pursuing. More 
precisely, the aim of this paper is to show that, contrary to popular opinion, measurement of 
evolutionary independence could be successful despite the heterogeneity of evolving lineages. 
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To do this, I first introduce evolutionary independence and show how standardisation could proceed 
by measuring this property (“Evolutionary independence, measurement and the Tobias criterion”). I 
then discuss the heterogeneity objection and argue that it is best interpreted as the claim that 
evolutionary independence cannot be measured because it is theoretically vague, heterogeneous, and 
operationalised in divergent ways (“The heterogeneity objection”). In response to this objection, I 
draw a parallel with the measurement of temperature. This parallel shows that the heterogeneity 
objection does not provide good reasons to abandon the measurement of evolutionary independence 
(“Measurement despite heterogeneity: The case of temperature”), and that measurement may even 
help to make the notion of evolutionary independence more precise (“Measurement as the way out”). 
Finally, I further qualify this point as an appeal for pragmatism about species classification (“A plea for 
pragmatism”), and conclude by observing the fit between this pragmatic measurement approach and 
recent developments in species delimitation. 
Evolutionary independence, measurement and the Tobias criterion 
Despite longstanding and ongoing debates about the nature of species, there is wide agreement at 
least that species are evolving lineages (e.g. De Queiroz 1998; Zachos 2016; Barker 2019).  Such 
lineages are ancestor-descendant sequences of populations that take part in, and are subject to, the 
same evolutionary processes. Because the populations and organisms that make up evolving lineages 
are connected to each other by evolutionary processes, these lineages are often called units of 
evolution that have a shared evolutionary fate distinct from that of other lineages. These units are 
typically seen as active in the sense that they take part in evolutionary processes. In this respect 
evolutionary lineages are different from lineages defined as monophyletic clades, which are merely 
the passive patterns that result from these processes (Baum 2009). 
Evolutionary lineages play a central role in current systematic research. For example, they are the 
target of the popular statistical model-based approaches to species delimitation. These model-based 
approaches use genetic or genomic datasets along with a set of assumptions about evolutionary 
processes to infer the history of diversification and species boundaries in the dataset (Edwards 2009; 
Camargo and Sites 2013; Carstens et al. 2013). Most popular among these model-based approaches 
are methods using the multispecies coalescent model (Yang and Rannala 2010; Fujita et al. 2012). This 
model, which connects population genetics and phylogenetics, estimates species trees while taking 
into account some of the population-level processes that cause discordance between species trees 
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and gene trees. This allows systematists to identify independently evolving lineages despite such 
discordance.  
Despite the central role of evolutionary lineages in systematic research, the notion has been cashed 
out in different ways (Barker 2019). Many of these define evolutionary lineages in terms of particular 
processes or causes, such as gene flow or shared selection pressures, that are responsible for the 
cohesion of these lineages. More useful for the purposes of standardisation are Kevin De Queiroz’ 
(1998) General Lineage Concept (GLC), plus broadly similar views by Mayden (1997), Wiley (1978), and 
Simpson (1961). Their so-called evolutionary conceptions of species do not privilege particular causes 
that need to be involved in the cohesion of lineages for them to count as evolving lineages. Instead, 
they recognize that these causes can be different for each lineage, and emphasize that despite this 
variation all species are similar in that they are independently evolving units. The broad applicability 
of these views, as well as their popularity among taxonomists, make them an obvious starting point 
for reducing taxonomic disorder. 
However, while the broadness of these evolutionary views of species allows them to capture the 
different ways in which groups of populations can be independently evolving lineages, it lies at the 
heart of their main weakness too. Phrases such as ‘independent evolution’, ‘a common evolutionary 
fate’ (Templeton 1992, p. 160), or ‘separate identities’ (Willmann and Meier 2000, p. 116) are 
metaphors, and critics argue that evolutionary conceptions of species are too vague to go beyond this 
metaphorical level (Barker 2019, pp. 9–11). In the absence of precise criteria for what constitutes 
independent evolution, unifying species under the label of independently evolving lineages may 
contribute more to taxonomic disorder than it does to resolving it.  
Three related sources of disorder are worth distinguishing here: evolutionary independence is 
continuous, independently evolving groups are not mutually exclusive, and evolutionary 
independence comes in many different shapes. First, while evolutionary independence was 
traditionally understood as a discrete property, it is now generally recognised to be a continuous 
property. For example, the evolutionary independence of two diverging lineages during speciation 
typically increases gradually as gene flow decreases and they acquire different characters (Roux et al. 
2016). It follows that there is no obvious point on the continuum that distinguishes the species level 
from more and less exclusive groups, and methods of species delimitation have to select a partially 
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arbitrary threshold of independent evolution to distinguish lineages that deserve species status from 
lineages that do not.1  
Second, genomic studies suggest that due to processes such as hybridization, lateral gene transfer and 
introgression, it is not uncommon for groups of organisms to evolve together for some traits while 
being independent for others (Mallet et al. 2015; Haber 2019). In addition, evolving lineages often 
contain smaller lineages and are nested in larger lineages. This means that populations are typically 
simultaneously part of multiple nested or overlapping evolving lineages. Because current practices of 
species classification assume that each population can only be part of one species, taxonomists have 
to decide which of these to recognise as species. 
Finally, different lineages evolve independently in widely different ways. Some independently evolving 
groups are reproductively isolated, others are subject to similar selective pressures, and others evolve 
independently in still other ways. To delimit species, therefore, taxonomists have to use a wide array 
of operationalisations suitable to the diversity of evolving lineages they encounter. When applied to 
the same groups, however, these operationalisations often point in different directions (Willis 2017; 
Zachos 2018). For example, a group may share the same selection pressures but not be reproductively 
isolated, or vice versa. Thus, taxonomists engaged in species delimitation sometimes have to choose 
between multiple divergent operationalisations. 
The result is taxonomic disorder: even taxonomists who work with the same organisms can come up 
with different classifications depending on how they operationalise evolutionary independence, 
where they set the threshold for species status, and which of several nested or partially overlapping 
lineages they recognise. To standardise species classification and resolve taxonomic disorder, then, 
more is needed than agreement on the view that species are independently evolving lineages. In 
addition, we would need a unitary scale that allows us to evaluate and compare lineages that are 
evolving independently in different ways. With such a scale in hand, it would be possible to set a 
threshold of evolutionary independence required for species status, and recognise all groups that 
meet this threshold. This would yield species that are comparable at least in the interesting sense that 
they are evolving independently to the same degree. 
                                                          
1 Note that by this continuum I do not mean a sequence of different indicators of evolutionary independence 
(e.g. diagnosability, reproductive isolation, etc.) such as on De Queiroz’ famous diagram of diverging lineages 
(De Queiroz, 1998, p. 64 fig. 5.4). De Queiroz’ diagram is problematic because these indicators often occur in 
different orders, shapes, and combinations. Instead, I propose thinking of evolutionary independence as a 
quantity (perhaps ordinal) that any group of populations has to some degree. 
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Given that this solution, if possible, would effectively resolve taxonomic disorder, it should not be 
surprising that various researchers have recently proposed to standardise species delimitation by 
means of what critics have termed ‘yardstick approaches’ (Halley et al. 2017, p. 390).2 These are 
standardised procedures that can be seen as assigning a certain degree of evolutionary independence 
to groups of organisms (Hey and Pinho 2012; Galtier 2019). To illustrate the measurement approach 
to species delimitation, the remainder of this section will briefly present one such yardstick method, 
namely, the Tobias criterion (Tobias et al. 2010).3 Note that I choose the Tobias criterion to illustrate 
the measurement approach because it is relatively simple, has received wide attention from both 
taxonomists and users of taxonomy (Remsen 2016; Burfield et al. 2017; Halley et al. 2017), and has 
been adopted in practice by the prominent organization Birdlife International for their species 
checklist (Hoyo and Collar 2014). It is not my aim to defend the Tobias criterion as the best method of 
species delimitation or even the most promising approach to measuring evolutionary independence.4  
The Tobias criterion is a standardised method for delimiting bird species on the basis of phenotypic 
divergence. Simply put, it assigns a score between one and four to three main kinds of traits (voice, 
morphology and biometrics), and a score of one or two to one subsidiary trait (ecological or 
behavioural divergence). In addition, a group gets a score between zero and three on the basis of its 
geographical relationships (ranging from allopatry to parapatry). These scores are then summed, and 
a group is recognised as a species if it scores seven or more. The degrees for each criterion are defined 
in terms of quantitative thresholds. These thresholds were set such that the approach recognises 95% 
of uncontroversial sympatric species at a score of seven. This way, the scores of a reference set of 
uncontroversial sympatric species form a yardstick to delimit new species or evaluate difficult cases 
like allopatric groups (Tobias et al. 2010, p. 731). 
Note that species delimitation using the Tobias criterion has all the components by which metrologists 
and philosophers of measurement typically define measurement (Cartwright et al. 2011; Tal 2013; 
                                                          
2 The connection between species delimitation and measurement has been made in philosophy too. More 
precisely, Conix (2018) draws an analogy between measurement and integrative methods of species 
delimitation. The claim in this paper is more radical, however, as I do not merely draw an analogy between one 
taxonomic method and measurement in the physical sciences, but instead propose to see species delimitation 
as a form of measurement. 
3 It is typically referred to as the Tobias criteria, referring to the multiple parameters in the model. I use ‘criterion’ 
here to emphasize that it integrates these parameters into a single score for species status. 
4 Indeed, it could be argued that a viable measurement approach should build on existing measures such as 
those of genetic divergence, population connectivity and the strength of isolation barriers (Coyne and Orr 1989; 
Palsbøll et al. 2007; Lowe and Allendorf 2010; Sobel et al. 2010). However, the Tobias criterion takes none of 
these into account. 
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Mari et al. 2017). Most obviously, there is a clearly defined set of objects (i.e. groups of organisms or 
populations), a target property (i.e. evolutionary independence) attributed to those objects, and a 
measurement instrument (i.e. the Tobias criterion). This measurement instrument is calibrated by 
means of a reference set of sympatric uncontroversial species that acts as a classical measurement 
standard. Less obviously, and in line with the consensus in recent epistemology of measurement, 
theory and background knowledge play a crucial role in the measurement process. Evolutionary 
independence is characterized theoretically as being on a unique trajectory through evolutionary 
space. The measurement instrument is designed in line with this theoretical characterization and 
further background knowledge. For example, it is known that indicators within one category of criteria 
are often causally related. For this reason, the system caps the number of points that a group can get 
within one category of criteria. This way, one species cannot get points both for, say, plumage pattern 
and plumage colour. 
A measurement method like the Tobias criterion has the potential to reduce taxonomic disorder in 
various ways. First, different taxonomists using the same data would get the same classifications, as 
the procedure and thresholds for species delimitation are standardised. This mitigates the problem of 
what Schlick-Steiner et al. (2010, p. 421) call ‘researcher bias’ in taxonomy: species classifications can 
turn out differently depending on the subjective decisions of the taxonomist conducting the research. 
Second, the outcomes of taxonomy would be unlikely to be biased by the choice of one particular 
indicator of evolutionary independence, as the Tobias criterion takes into account a range of 
independent indicators and maps them on a single scale. Finally, recognised species would arguably 
be more comparable because major sources of incomparability, such as the use of only one indicator 
of evolutionary independence, are eliminated. It should also be mentioned that the method’s ability 
to reduce disorder can be expected to increase over time, as the transparency of the method 
facilitates further improvements and tweaking of the measure (Burfield et al. 2017; Donegan 2018).  
Of course, the Tobias criterion faces problems too. Indeed, these problems have proven substantial 
enough to prevent most taxonomists from adopting it (Rheindt et al. 2011; but see e.g. Balen et al. 
2013; Schuchmann et al. 2016). However, most of these problems do not concern the measurement 
approach, but the particular way the Tobias criterion implements it. Most importantly, the Tobias 
criterion bypasses genetic data completely, thus ignoring much of the progress made in species 
delimitation over the past decade. In addition, the criterion has been criticised for the way it scores 
hybrid zones, its use of hard cut-offs for mostly continuous criteria, and the subjective evaluation of 
plumage pattern it requires (Remsen 2015, 2016; Donegan 2018). Finally, the system is obviously only 
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applicable to birds, and thus resolves only a small part of taxonomic disorder. As Donegan (2018), 
Tobias et al. (2010) and Burfield et al. (2017) argue, these problems can easily be mitigated. For 
example, additional scores for genetic data could be implemented, and spectrophotometry could be 
used to quantitatively assess plumage patterns and colours. The approach could also be extended to 
other taxa by adding further criteria, adapting the reference set accordingly, and setting new 
thresholds.  
A more substantial problem is signalled by Remsen (2015), who points out that the sample of species 
in the reference set is phylogenetically biased as the species are almost exclusively taken from the 
order of Passeriformes. It seems dubious, then, to apply the system to other orders of birds too. As 
Remsen (2016, p. 112) puts it, ‘who cannot appreciate that a scoring scheme derived almost 
completely from small diurnal passerines might not be appropriate for assessing species limits in, for 
example, petrels or owls?’ While this problem may seem easy to resolve by broadening the reference 
set, it points to deeper problems that go to the core of the measurement approach: how can a 
representative set be selected from the extreme variety of taxa throughout the tree of life, and will the 
resulting measure not simply churn out whatever kind of variety we decide to put in the reference set 
in the first place? Remsen’s objection questions whether it is in principle possible to create a unitary 
scale of evolutionary independence that is applicable across different groups. I turn to this crucial 
objection, which I call the heterogeneity objection, in the next section. 
The Heterogeneity objection 
The heterogeneity of independently evolving groups is far more extensive than suggested by Remsen’s 
quote about different bird species. Most obviously, the notion applies to groups like Homo sapiens, 
which evolve independently from other lineages due to extensive gene flow within the species and 
little exchange of genes with other species. Such evolutionary independence can be contrasted with 
that of groups like Edith's checkerspot (Euphydryas editha), a butterfly species that retains high 
evolutionary cohesion despite a lack of regular gene flow between populations (Ehrlich and Raven 
1969). Similarly, it is substantially different from the evolutionary independence of species in 
syngameons, which are collections of species that evolve independently despite substantial gene flow 
between them (Templeton 1992; Barker 2007). The evolutionary independence of all these cases is in 
turn radically different from that of Erythranthe peregrina, a polyploid species of monkeyflower from 
Scotland that is independent from its diploid parental species because it has a different number of 
chromosomes (Vallejo‐Marín et al. 2015); a facultative parthenogenetic species such as the New 
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Zealand Mud snail (Potamopyrgus antipodarum); and groups that exchange nuclear genes but not 
mitochondrial ones, such as Discoglossus jeanneae and galganoi (García-París and Jockusch 1999).  
Anyone familiar with recent philosophy of biology knows that this heterogeneous list of independently 
evolving lineages could be extended indefinitely. These examples are also complemented by growing 
insight into discordance between lineages at different hierarchical levels (Maddison 1997; Haber 2012, 
2019). Most importantly, it is well known that discordance between gene trees and species trees due 
to phenomena such as incomplete lineage sorting, introgression, lateral gene transfer and 
hybridization is very common. This means that within any organism, some genes are more closely 
related to those of organisms in another species than to those of its conspecifics. This substantially 
complicates the notion of evolutionary independence, as it means that even within eukaryotes there 
is no one-on-one mapping between lineages at different hierarchical levels. 
Various biologists have objected to the idea of a unitary scale of evolutionary independence on the 
grounds of this heterogeneity. For example, in his discussion of the Tobias criterion, Galtier (2019) 
asks ‘how can a standard be defined when … speciation in nature can follow so many different routes?’ 
Similarly, Halley et al. (2017, p. 390) remark that choosing a yardstick is ‘biased by sampling error that 
stems from the vagaries of extinction and incomplete sampling’. More broadly, a similar objection 
seems to follow directly from theoretical species pluralism. While many pluralists accept that all 
species are lineages, they emphasise that there are different kinds of lineages that evolve 
independently in different senses. In his discussion of De Queiroz’ GLC, for example, Marc Ereshefsky 
(2011, p. 75) writes that the catch-all concept of independently evolving lineage just ‘masks the 
heterogeneity of the species category because what constitutes a lineage has multiple answers, and 
those answers vary according to which species concept [i.e. operationalisation] one adopts’. In other 
words, integrating different operationalisations of evolutionary independence under a single concept 
is not helpful because they pick out different interesting features from the organic world. 
The picture that emerges from these objections can be captured in three related claims. First, the 
notion of evolutionary independence is theoretically vague. It is typically clarified by means of 
metaphors, and whenever it is developed in more precise terms it seems to take a different meaning 
in different contexts of use. Thus, rather than picking out a precise quality or quantity, it seems to 
capture a loose family resemblance cluster of properties. Second, and closely related to this, the 
concept is manifested in a heterogeneous collection of groups. While all these groups are 
characterised by some of the properties associated with the family resemblance cluster, there are no 
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core properties they all have in common. Third, and as a result of the previous two points, there are 
many competing operationalisations of evolutionary independence, and there is no principled way of 
choosing between them. Depending on which operationalisation is chosen, different groups are 
individuated as independently evolving lineages.  
Taken together, these three points pose a seemingly insurmountable hurdle for the measurement of 
evolutionary independence. The problem is best represented as a sort of catch-22: The concept of 
evolutionary independence is theoretically vague. Because of this vagueness, it applies to a wide 
variety of groups but does not make them comparable in an interesting way. To make the concept 
useful, then, it needs to be made more precise. Biologists try exactly this when they operationalise 
the notion. However, these operationalisations are typically only useful for a small part of all 
independently evolving lineages and are often in conflict with each other. Because of this, the 
operationalisations also fail to make species comparable. To make the operationalisations of 
evolutionary independence useful for resolving taxonomic disorder, then, we need a way of 
arbitrating between them. However – and this brings us full circle – this is only possible if the 
theoretical notion itself is more precise. Thus, resolving the theoretical vagueness of evolutionary 
independence requires better operationalisations, and improving operationalisations requires a 
precise theory. 
This heterogeneity fuelled catch-22 seems to render the project of developing a unitary scale of the 
quantity – and, indeed, calling it a quantity to begin with – misguided: lacking both a precise theory 
and broadly applicable operationalisations, it seems impossible to construct a unitary scale of 
evolutionary independence that allows us to compare groups as heterogeneous as the ones we find 
in the organic world.  
Measurement despite heterogeneity: The case of temperature 
The heterogeneity objection states that measurement of evolutionary independence is impossible 
because the notion is vague, applies to a heterogeneous collection of measurands (things being 
measured), and is operationalised in many different ways. Together, the objection states, these 
characteristics lead to a catch-22 that makes measurement impossible. It follows from this that 
biologists should not pursue the measurement of evolutionary independence. This section suggests 
that this conclusion is too quick. I argue that even if evolutionary independence is vague, 
heterogeneous and operationalised in multiple ways, it does not follow that measurement cannot 
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succeed. To do this, I show that the same three characteristics were once true for the physical notion 
of temperature. As measurement of temperature is highly successful and precise today, it follows that 
these three characteristics do not make the development of a useful measurement scale impossible 
in the way the heterogeneity objection suggests. 
Before showing how the thee characteristics once applied to temperature, it is worth addressing the 
objection that temperature and evolutionary independence are simply too different for the analogy 
to work. There are at least four such differences. First, temperature is a physical quantity that applies 
to physical systems while evolutionary independence applies to groups of biological populations 
partaking in evolutionary processes. Second, temperature is defined on the molecular level, while 
evolutionary independence is defined on the macro-level of organisms and populations. Third, 
evolutionary independence is a purely theoretical term while temperature is both a theoretical term 
and a natural language term for describing day-to-day sensations. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, temperature is a precise quantity that does not depend on particular decisions made by 
those who measure it. That is, while measuring temperature requires choosing a scale, different 
substances can be meaningfully measured and compared as long as we choose the same scale. This 
stands in stark contrast to the characteristics of evolutionary independence highlighted by the 
heterogeneity objection.  
I argue that the first three of these dissimilarities are not relevant here. The question is whether, as 
the heterogeneity objection implies, theoretical vagueness, heterogeneity of measurands, and 
conflicting operationalisations are good reasons to abandon the attempt to measure a particular 
theoretical quantity. To the extent that temperature was characterised by these three features, it is 
relevant to answering this question with respect to evolutionary independence. More interestingly, I 
will argue that the final dissimilarity – that temperature is independent from particular decisions of 
those who measure it – is false. While temperature is currently precise and independent from how 
scientists operationalise it, this was not always so. The remainder of this section will argue that, like 
evolutionary independence, temperature was vague, heterogeneous, and operationalised in multiple 
divergent ways. 
To show that scientists measuring temperature originally faced the same difficulties as present-day 
taxonomists, consider first the vagueness of the theoretical notions of temperature and heat. Over 
the course of the seventeenth, eighteenth and part of the nineteenth century, during which much 
progress on the topic of heat was made, there was no generally accepted theoretical framework. Early 
12 
 
 
on, theories of heat were mostly based on Aristotle’s thinking. They were over time replaced by caloric 
theories, which view heat as a substance. The distinction between heat and temperature only came 
to be recognised by Joseph Black in the second half of the eighteenth century, and it was not until well 
into the nineteenth century that caloric theories of heat were abandoned in favour of the kinetic 
theory that forms the basis of modern theories about heat and temperature (Barnett 1956; Chang 
2004). 
Second, the heterogeneity of measurands was arguably larger in the case of temperature than in that 
of evolutionary independence. According to Aristotle’s thinking, which was still highly influential when 
the first thermometers were developed, hot and cold were even fundamental qualities that were 
present in different proportions in any body whatsoever (Barnett 1956). And just as in the case of 
evolutionary independence, heat is manifested in different substances in different ways and caused 
by a range of different processes. This heterogeneity is nicely illustrated by Francis Bacon’s (1902, pp. 
121–123) famous table of ‘instances agreeing in the form of heat’. Besides unsurprising phenomena 
such as flames, hot springs and the rays of the sun, this table contains ‘green and moist vegetable 
matter confined and rubbed together’, ‘the oil of marjoram’, alcohol, vinegar when applied to 
wounded parts of the body, and even ‘severe and intense cold’. Of course, we know now that all 
instances of heat are common in an interesting way.  However, as this was not known to seventeenth 
and eighteenth century scientists developing thermometers, they faced heterogeneity at least as large 
as that observed today in evolutionary independence.  
Finally, different scientists operationalised temperature in widely different ways, and results differed 
greatly depending on which measuring method was used (see Barnett 1956; and Chang 2004 for an 
overview). Over the course of more than two centuries, measurement procedures involved gas 
thermometers, fluid thermometers and hybrids between the two; a wide variety of thermometric 
substances including water, air, mercury, vinegar, alcohol and linseed oil; a variety of glass bulbs and 
containers, including Galileo’s single bulb thermometer and later two-bulbed thermometers (Barnett 
1956, p. 275); a variety of scales, such as Fahrenheit’s, Celsius’ and Newton’s; and a variety of fixed 
points to calibrate these scales, including the boiling and freezing points of water, the melting point 
of butter, blood heat, first night frost, and the mean temperature of the King’s chamber in the Great 
Pyramid of Giza (Chang 2004, p. 11). 
Again, with our current insight in temperature it is tempting to think that all research using these 
various operationalisations was backed up by common principles. After all, many relied on the 
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expansion of thermometric substances when heated. We now know that temperature can be 
measured relatively reliably with a variety of thermometric substances, and that the mechanisms 
underlying these procedures are similar. In that sense, it might seem that there was more theoretical 
agreement about measuring temperature in the eighteenth century than there is now about assessing 
evolutionary independence. However, this seeming unity is an anachronism. Even if in hindsight their 
methods strike us as similar, scientists at the time were convinced that there was only one correct 
thermometric substance, and employed different candidates based on different theoretical 
assumptions. Without the current knowledge about the nature of temperature and the mechanisms 
underlying thermometers, scientists faced vagueness and heterogeneity similar to what currently 
characterises research on evolutionary independence. 
In short, temperature was theoretically vague, heterogeneous, and operationalised in many ways. 
Still, this did not stop scientists from developing a highly precise and successful measure. This shows 
that even when the world turns out ‘much messier than scientists would have liked’ (Chang 2004, p. 
49), sustained scientific effort can yield a precise and productive notion. This is why Hasok Chang’s 
celebrated account of the history of temperature is called Inventing temperature: The precision of the 
concept is a scientific accomplishment and manufacturing it took multiple centuries of effort of many 
clever scientists. The point then is that heterogeneity, theoretical vagueness and multiple 
operationalisations need not stop us from developing a similarly useful measure of evolutionary 
independence. 
Measurement as the way out 
The previous section relied on the history of measuring temperature to argue that extensive 
heterogeneity does not make the measurement of a quantity impossible. This section continues to 
draw on the case of temperature to make the more positive point that measurement may even help 
to make the notion of evolutionary independence more precise. 
The development of a precise theory and measure of temperature required overcoming the same 
catch-22 that taxonomists face today: to develop reliable measures, one needs a clear theory of what 
is measured; at the same time, such a theory can only be developed and tested if a reliable measure 
of that quantity is already at hand. This circular interdependence of theory and measurement is, of 
course, a well known problem in philosophy of science, which Van Fraassen (2008, chapter 5) and Tal 
(2013, pp. 1159–1160) have called the ‘problem of coordination’, and Chang (2004, pp. 57–60) the 
problem of ‘nomic measurement’. Because of the impressive theoretical and metrological progress 
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over the course of only a few centuries, the case of temperature has received particular attention in 
discussions about the problem of coordination. While the details of this discussion exceed the scope 
of this paper, I want to highlight one important point of agreement that is particularly relevant here: 
developing measurement procedures, even in the absence of a clear theory, was crucial for 
overcoming the problem of coordination and developing modern theories of temperature. Similarly, I 
argue, pursuing measurement of evolutionary independence may be a promising strategy for making 
the notion more precise. 
The history of thermometry is riddled with episodes that illustrate the importance of measurement in 
overcoming the coordination problem. Here, one brief example will serve to make the point.5 The 
example concerns one of the most illustrious conceptual advances in the study of heat, namely, Joseph 
Black’s notion of latent heat. According to Sherry (2011), it was the success of Black’s quantitative 
concept of heat capacity that provided the first justification that temperature could be treated as a 
cardinal (rather than ordinal) quantity. More precisely, Black’s theory assumed temperature to be 
such a quantity, and the success of his theory thus provided abductive support for this assumption. 
Important here is that Black was only successful at quantifying his notion of heat capacity because he 
could rely on Fahrenheit’s very precise mercury thermometer to measure the change in temperature 
in mixtures of substances with different temperatures. Barnett (1956, p. 312) points out that 
experiments like Black’s, which relied on very precise measurements, would not have been possible 
with the air thermometers that preceded the closed liquid thermometers such as Fahrenheit’s. While 
Fahrenheit’s thermometers suffered from the same theoretical problems as these air thermometers 
(i.e. they were not comparable to other measuring devices using different scales and different 
thermometric substances) they were far more precise and comparable to each other. Fahrenheit was 
known for his careful construction of thermometers, which would yield results that varied less than 
one sixteenth of a degree from each other (Sherry 2011, p. 512). This precision allowed Black to make 
the measurements required to quantify his notion of latent heat and develop his theory. 
This episode illustrates that measurement in the absence of a developed theoretical framework can 
play a crucial role in resolving the coordination problem. The carefully crafted and highly comparable 
thermometers of Fahrenheit were a necessary requirement for Joseph Black’s quantification of 
temperature and the concept of latent heat. Thus, at least in the case of temperature it would have 
                                                          
5 For another apt example, see Chang’s (2004, chapter 2) discussion of how Regnault showed the air 
thermometer to be more reliable than the mercury thermometer without making substantial theoretical 
commitments.  
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been wrong to assume that a developed theory was needed before engaging in measurement. Indeed, 
the development of reliable measurement procedures and a scale were necessary steps in getting to 
such a theory. Measurement theorists infer from this that the circularity between theory and 
measurement of the coordination problem is not vicious, but a way to overcome the problem: theory 
and operationalisation inform each other through multiple iterative steps. Rudimentary measurement 
procedures lead to outcomes that need to be accounted for theoretically; these theories, in turn, can 
then be used to construct better measurement methods, and so on. As van Fraassen (2008, p. 116) 
puts it: ‘The questions What counts as a measurement of (physical quantity) X? and What is (that 
physical quantity) X? cannot be answered independently of each other’. 
This suggests an alternative way forward for species delimitation: instead of abandoning 
measurement of evolutionary independence because of the messy state of nature, we can also pursue 
measurement to create a notion that is more precise. This may be possible, because measures and a 
scale like the Tobias criterion can be developed without a clear theory of evolutionary independence. 
These measures can then be one small step in the process of developing a clear theory. While there is 
no guarantee that this will turn out as successfully for evolutionary independence as it did for 
temperature, it is clear that the current vagueness and heterogeneity of the concept are not good 
reasons to think that it would not. 
A plea for pragmatism 
The previous section argued that measuring evolutionary independence may help to make the notion 
more precise in the same way measurement was crucial to clarifying temperature. I am not claiming, 
however, that measurement will turn out as successful for evolutionary independence as it did for 
temperature. Even if concepts like temperature are scientific creations, their success is also 
constrained by what the world is like and various historical contingencies. However, this need not 
discourage attempts to measure evolutionary independence. I argue that even if precision such as 
that of temperature turns out unattainable, sophisticated measures of evolutionary independence 
may be practically useful.  
There are many useful scientific concepts that are vague, heterogeneous, and have a different 
meaning depending on the context of use and the way they are operationalised. Take the concept of 
inflation. Broadly defined as the increase in the general price level in an economy over a particular 
time, inflation is measured by tracking the change in a price index that in turn tracks the cost of buying 
a fixed basket of goods and services. However, depending on which goods are included in the basket 
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and how they are weighted, the concept takes on different meanings and measures yield different 
outcomes (Reiss 2008, 2013). As a consequence, it is generally accepted that ‘there is no “true” 
inflation rate’ but rather ‘numerous inflation indices that are more or less useful relative to the given 
purpose’ (Reiss 2008, p. 46). Still, the measurement of inflation plays a crucial role both in economic 
policymaking and in scientific research (Reiss 2008, pp. 23–24). Important here is that while the choice 
of any particular way of measuring inflation is partially arbitrary, economists and policymakers can 
usefully compare the price level at different points in time once one such a measure is chosen. 
The analogy with inflation here serves to support a plea for pragmatism: a measure can be highly 
valuable even if it is recognised to be arbitrary. Arbitrariness would be a small price to pay if measuring 
evolutionary independence contributes to resolving taxonomic disorder. This plea ties into the debate 
about the use of DNA barcoding for species recognition and delimitation (Wheeler 2005; Hebert and 
Gregory 2005). Proponents of barcoding approaches emphasise epistemic values such as the gain in 
efficiency, comparability, and repeatability while opponents point out that barcoding fails to provide 
in-depth understanding of the complex evolutionary processes and relations that shape the organic 
world. A sophisticated measurement approach could yield precisely the epistemic advantages 
highlighted by proponents of DNA barcoding. Moreover, such an approach does not rule out the in-
depth research advocated by barcoding opponents. Such research would be necessary to inform 
measurement approaches, particularly when they are attuned to particular taxa such as the Tobias 
criterion. In addition, thorough systematic research remains valuable even if there are constraints on 
which groups can be recognised as species. 
Some taxonomists interpret the yardstick approach to evolutionary independence in this pragmatic 
way.  Discussing ‘pragmatic approaches’ such as the Tobias criterion, Zachos (2018, p. 814) writes: 
Rather than continue to search for the Holy Grail, it has been suggested to agree on a 
consistent and quantifiable delimitation procedure for what is then called species. This way, 
given the same raw data, different taxonomists would at least come up with the same species 
delimitations in a consistent and repeatable (albeit still not completely nonarbitrary) way. 
In other words, a practically useful measure of evolutionary independence, along with a threshold for 
species status, may be the best we can do. Such a measure could be attuned and limited to certain 
taxa, such as mammals, to ensure that at least within these groups species delimitation would be 
transparent, intersubjectively stable, and yield units that are comparable for the properties that are 
chosen for the standardised operationalisation.  While these properties may not be more interesting 
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than the ones used by other viable operationalisations, this would at least guarantee that research or 
practices that rely on species as their currency are not working with radically different groups of 
organisms. This is precisely the approach that economists have taken, with considerable practical 
success, to measuring inflation. 
Note that the practical usefulness of such a measure for evolutionary independence should be 
evaluated in comparison with current practices of species recognition. That is, a measurement system 
does not have to resolve all issues of the species problem to be worthwhile; instead, it must simply be 
better, all things considered, than the current system and its disorder. This is precisely what Tobias et 
al. (2010, p. 742) state in support of their measurement method:  
[The Tobias Criterion] clearly adds a greater measure of uniformity to the taxonomic decision 
making process, and has the power to produce taxonomic changes that are consistent and 
easily valuated by independent reviewers. This contrasts markedly with current practice in 
avian systematics, which generates anything from narrowly divergent allopatric ‘species’ to 
highly divergent ‘subspecies’. If carefully applied, our system can therefore help to resolve 
difficult cases with conservation implications, and to produce a global taxonomy of 
comparable species units. 
Many scientific concepts, such as inflation, well-being and perhaps even ecological fitness, show that 
pursuing measurement of vague concepts can yield considerable epistemic and practical benefits. 
Again, the point is that the heterogeneity and vagueness of evolutionary independence do not provide 
good reasons to abandon the measurement approach. On the contrary, even: measurement methods 
can sometimes create an acceptable degree of comparability where it is lacking in the world. 
Conclusions 
I have argued that the vagueness of the concept of evolutionary independence and the heterogeneity 
of phenomena it applies to do not provide good reasons to abandon attempts to measure evolutionary 
independence. Indeed, measurement may even help in further clarifying the notion, and might yield 
epistemic benefits even if precision such as that of temperature is unattainable. To end the paper, I 
want to briefly point out that the measurement approach fits well with recent developments in the 
field of species delimitation.  
This field has recently witnessed a remarkable explosion in new and sophisticated methods for 
delimiting species (Sites and Marshall 2003; Camargo and Sites 2013; Carstens et al. 2013). These 
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methods mostly use genetic and genomic data in combination with evolutionary models to pick out 
independently evolving lineages. Characteristic of this ‘renaissance’ (Sites and Marshall 2003, p. 462) 
in species delimitation is its focus on the operationalisation of species classification. Rather than 
engaging in controversies about species concepts, these new approaches in taxonomy bracket 
theoretical debates, and instead focus on practical methods of delimitation. Even though these 
methods often yield conflicting results and thus continue taxonomic disorder, the results are 
promising: the models become increasingly sophisticated and are able to take into account more 
relevant variables, the procedures for any single method are transparent and yield the same results 
regardless of who performs them, and these methods improve our understanding of speciation and 
the various processes that play a role in it (Fujita et al. 2012; Flot 2015).  
The measurement approach fits in this new tradition in that it tries to resolve taxonomic disorder by 
focusing on operationalisation rather than species concepts. This is not to imply that we should not 
try to make the theoretical notion of evolutionary independence more precise.6 Instead, the point is 
that the easiest way of doing this may be through developing measurement procedures. With its focus 
on operationalisation over theory, the position defended in this paper (and taken from the recent 
renaissance) is the opposite of that defended recently about measurement of mental attributes 
(Bringmann and Eronen 2016) and well-being (Alexandrova and Haybron 2016). These authors argue 
that in both fields a lack of theoretical development combined with nearly exclusive attention for 
operationalisations impedes progress in tracking these properties. With the existing sophisticated 
measures in hand, they argue, it has become clear that theory-avoidant focus on operationalisations 
is not productive. I argue that species delimitation is on the other side of the cycle between theory 
and measurement: pursuing sophisticated measurement methods may help us break through the 
theoretical deadlock of the species problem and provide a solution for taxonomic disorder. 
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